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intruders, but whether a database possessor has a legal
obligation to disclose evidence of a security breach to data
subjects once an intrusion occurs. The third issue is how
far liability should extend when the database possessor
has failed to exercise reasonable care to protect data or to
disclose information about an intrusion.
S TAT U TO RY D U T I E S TO
P R OT E C T DATA

By Vincent R. Johnson

umerous lawsuits have recently been filed against data
possessors (such as banks and universities) by data subjects (such as customers and alumni) seeking damages
for harm caused by breaches of data security.1 Some of
these claims have been successful. Courts have held, for
example, that a union has a duty to safeguard its members’
information2 and have imposed liability for improper disposal of educational records.3 However, other claims have
failed.4
Whether and to what extent courts hold database
possessors liable for damages caused by improper data
access are questions of huge importance. Unless courts
impose some form of liability, the persons often in the
best position to prevent the losses caused by identity
theft may have insufficient incentive to exercise care to
avoid unnecessary harm. However, if liability is too readily assessed, it may bankrupt valuable enterprises because
of the vast numbers of potential plaintiffs and extensive
resulting damages.
Despite the recent enactment of security breach notification statutes in 35 states,5 the law governing database
possessor liability is unsettled. In considering this field of
tort law, it is useful to differentiate three questions. The
first issue is whether database possessors have a legal duty
to safeguard data subjects’ personal information from
unauthorized access by hackers or others. Such obligations
may be imposed by statutes, ordinary tort principles, or
fiduciary duty law. The second issue concerns not whether
there is a duty to protect computerized information from
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A statute may impose a duty to exercise care to
protect data from intruders. An important example is
California’s Security Breach Information Act (SBIA).6
The SBIA has served as a model for legislation subsequently adopted in numerous other jurisdictions. Mutual
concerns animate the various state laws, which often share
a common language and structure. However, the statutes
sometimes differ in important respects. One key difference
concerns whether a breach of the duties imposed by the
act is expressly actionable in a private lawsuit.
The California SBIA imposes a data protection obligation and expressly authorizes maintenance of a suit for
damages caused by a breach of that duty. The relevant
language, which became effective July 1, 2003, states:
“A business that owns or licenses personal information
about a California resident shall implement and maintain
reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate
to the nature of the information, to protect the personal
information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure.”7 The legislation further provides that “Any customer injured by a violation of this
title may institute a civil action to recover damages.”8
The SBIA leaves no doubt that businesses owe a
duty under California law to protect customers’ personal
information and that customers may recover damages if
businesses breach that duty. The civil actions that the
California legislature has instructed the courts to entertain
are rooted in principles of negligence. Only unreasonable
(i.e., negligent) conduct violates the California SBIA.
However, beyond offering clear guidance regarding the
existence of duty and the liability regime, the SBIA leaves
many matters unsettled. The SBIA makes no attempt to
define what constitutes “reasonable security procedures
and practices.” More importantly, the SBIA gives no indication as to what types of damages plaintiffs can recover.
In some states security breach notification laws
require database possessors to protect personal information from unauthorized access but make no provision for
civil liability.9 Many of those laws nevertheless leave room
for judicial recognition of a civil cause of action. Under a
traditional negligence per se analysis, a court may, in its
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discretion, embrace a statute not expressly providing for a
civil cause of action as the standard of care for a tort suit.
If the legislature intended the enactment to protect the
class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member from
the type of harm that occurred, a court may determine
that violation of the statute defines the appropriate terms
for imposing civil liability.10 Many state laws satisfy these
requirements. However, in some cases, the language of a
statute suggests that the legislation should not be deemed
to set the standard of care.
For example, the Arkansas Personal Information
Protection Act,11 which provides for enforcement by the
attorney general, states that it “does not relieve a person
or business from a duty to comply with any other requirements of other state and federal law regarding the protection and privacy of personal information.”12 The absence
of any provision for private enforcement and the second
usage of the word “other” seem to suggest that a court
should not embrace the security breach notification law,
by itself, as the basis for a civil cause of action.
Similarly, it is difficult to envision that the Texas
security breach statute13 could be a predicate for a negligence per se claim. Unlike the California SBIA, the
Texas act does not create a civil cause of action against a
database possessor that fails to exercise reasonable care. In
addition, the act expressly provides for a deceptive trade
practices action against hackers and others who “obtain,
possess, transfer, or use [the] personal identifying information of another” without authorization.14 It would be
reasonable to interpret the Texas statute as an expression
that civil liability should extend only to hackers and other
unauthorized persons and not to database possessors.
C O M M O N L AW D U T I E S TO
P R OT E C T DATA
Aside from statutes, common law principles support judicial recognition of a database possessor’s duty to
safeguard information from intruders. Two landmark cases
offer guidance: Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.15 and
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp.16
In Palsgraf, Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo set down
the basic rule on duty for the New York Court of Appeals:
“The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or
to others within the range of apprehension.”17 In Palsgraf,
nothing in the appearance of a newspaper-wrapped package carried by a man trying to board a moving train gave
notice that the parcel contained explosives. Therefore,
nothing warned the trainmen that Helen Palsgraf, a
patron waiting across the platform, was in danger. There
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was as to her no “risk reasonably to be perceived” and
thus no “duty to be obeyed.” As she was concerned, the
railroad had no legal obligation not to carelessly dislodge
the package while trying to assist the man who was running for the train.
Courts today continue to apply the Palsgraf duty rule.
Thus, it is useful to ask whether, from the standpoint of
database possessors, there is a “risk reasonably to be perceived” to data subjects if data is not protected from unauthorized intrusion. Obviously, in many situations (such
as when hackers can access data via the Internet), the
answer is yes. At least on its face, the basic rule in Palsgraf
suggests that database possessors should often have a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect data from intruders.
Palsgraf did not involve the threat of criminal intervention, but Kline did. In Kline, a landlord was on notice
that “an increasing number of assaults, larcenies, and
robberies [were] being perpetrated against the tenants in
and from the common” areas of a large apartment building.18 In holding the landlord responsible for a subsequent
attack on the plaintiff, the court said that a landlord is by
no “means an insurer of the safety of his tenants” and is
not obliged “to provide protection commonly owed by a
municipal police department.”19 However, a landlord is
under a duty to take such precautions as “are within his
power and capacity to take” in order to prevent harm by
criminal intruders.20 In writing for the District of Columbia
Circuit, Judge Malcolm Richard Wilkey emphasized the
fact that the landlord was the only party in a position to
secure the common areas:
No individual tenant had it within his power to
take measures to guard the garage entranceways, to
provide scrutiny at the main entrance of the building, to patrol the common hallways and elevators,
to set up any kind of a security alarm system in the
building, to provide additional locking devices on
the main doors, to provide a system of announcement for authorized visitors only, to close the garage
doors at appropriate hours, and to see that the
entrance was manned at all times.21
The court added:
The landlord is entirely justified in passing on the
cost of increased protective measures to his tenants,
but the rationale of compelling the landlord to do it
in the first place is that he is the only one who is in
a position to take the necessary protective measures
for overall protection of the premises . . . . 22
A similar analysis is equally applicable to cases
involving database security. Individual data subjects are
in a poor position to protect database information from
intruders. The database possessor, in contrast, is the only

23
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one with the ability to mitigate the risk that intruders may
cause harm. As in Kline, the database possessor can spread
the cost of providing database security to a broader class of
data subjects, at least when there is customer relationship
between the plaintiff and defendant. Kline, like Palsgraf,
suggests that, at least in some circumstances, database
possessors should owe data subjects a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect data from intruders.
In both Palsgraf and Kline, there was a relationship
between the plaintiff and the defendant. Palsgraf was a
ticket purchaser of the defendant railroad; Kline was a tenant of the defendant corporation. Those relational ties are
important, for other cases teach that duty often depends
upon more than foreseeability of harm and opportunity
to take precautions; it depends, sometimes, on a special
linkage between the party who owes the duty and the
one who receives its benefit. In this regard, recent cases
involving allegedly negligent enablement of imposter
fraud are instructive.
In Huggins v. Citibank, N.A.,23 for example, the plaintiff sued various banks on the ground that they “negligently
issued credit cards” in the plaintiff’s name to an “unknown
imposter.” The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that
the banks issued “credit cards without any investigation,
verification, or corroboration” of the applicant’s identity.
In response, “the [b]anks asserted they owed no duty to
[the plaintiff] because he was not their customer.” The
court agreed with the defendants and wrote:
In order for negligence liability to attach, the parties must have a relationship recognized by law as
the foundation of a duty of care. In the absence of
a duty to prevent an injury, foreseeability of that
injury is an insufficient basis on which to rest liability. . . . The relationship, if any, between credit card
issuers and potential victims of identity theft is far
too attenuated to rise to the level of a duty between
them.24
Other courts have reached similar conclusions.25
Together, Palsgraf, Kline, and Huggins indicate that
the strongest cases for imposing a common law duty to
guard data from intruders will be those in which there is a
business relationship between the defendant database possessor and the plaintiff data subject. This conclusion makes
sense on economic as well as doctrinal grounds. Imposing a
duty of care in these cases will force the database possessor,
which benefits from the use of computerized information,
to internalize losses relating to improperly accessed data
as a cost of doing business. That duty will in turn create
an incentive for database possessors to scrutinize whether
their business methods are really worth the costs that they
entail. At the same time, the imposition of a duty in a
business context gives the database possessor a means for
24
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distributing the loss by adjusting the price of the goods or
services that it sells to the class of persons that ultimately
benefits from the defendant’s business methods. That reallocation of losses will help ensure that the costs relating to
improperly accessed data will not fall with crushing weight
on either the data subject or the database possessor.
Placing a burden on database possessors to protect
data from unauthorized access would tend to reduce
intruder-related losses by encouraging investment in database security. That investment would be consistent with
the possessors’ own interests because unauthorized access
entails huge costs, in terms of public relations and otherwise, for those who maintain databases.
VO L U N TA RY A S S U M P T I O N O F A
D U T Y TO P R OT E C T DATA
Even if courts decline to impose a tort duty to safeguard data on database possessors generally (or at least on
businesses), voluntary-assumption-of-duty principles may
create a legally enforceable data-protection obligation.26A
person not otherwise under a duty to exercise reasonable
care may voluntarily assume the responsibility to do so.
One way of assuming this duty is by promising to exercise care and thereby inducing detrimental reliance.27
Another way is by “undertak[ing] to render services” and
consequently increasing the risk of harm to the plaintiff.28
Either way, the party that undertook the duty of reasonable care will be subject to liability if it breaches the voluntarily assumed duty and causes damages.
These well-established principles may apply when
consumers reveal personal information to financial institutions in reliance on financial institutions’ stated privacy
policies. For example, the policy of one major banking
institution, which is not atypical, states in reassuring
terms:
The law gives you certain privacy rights. Bank of
America gives you more. . . . Keeping financial
information secure is one of our most important
responsibilities. We maintain physical, electronic
and procedural safeguards to protect Customer
Information. . . . All companies that act on our
behalf are contractually obligated to keep the information we provide to them confidential . . . .29
A customer reading this information would conclude,
at a minimum, that in exchange for entrusting the bank
with personal information, the bank agreed (1) to protect
the data by means of physical, electronic, and procedural
safeguards and (2) to keep it confidential. Other language
in the privacy policy reinforces those sensible conclusions
by stressing the importance of precautions on the part of
the customer to guard against disclosure or unauthorized
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use of account and personal information. The same is true
of statements in the bank’s advertising and on its Web
site emphasizing the dangers of identity theft and assuring
the customer that “[y]our checking account statements
are always protected in Online Banking.”30 A court might
reasonably interpret such a privacy policy as an undertaking to exercise reasonable care and might conclude that a
breach of that duty would support a tort cause of action.
Similarly, even if the plaintiff never read or relied
on the institution’s privacy policy, a court might impose
a duty of care under the other prong of the undertaking
rule, which says that, when services provided for the protection of another increase the risk of harm “beyond that
which existed without the undertaking,” there is a duty
to exercise reasonable care.31 Depending on the facts, the
measures taken to protect computerized data (e.g., use of
passwords and firewalls) may contain flaws that increase
the risk of unauthorized data access. An increased risk
of harm might also result when data protection practices
allow transmission of unencrypted data, which is especially
vulnerable to hacking.
F I D U C I A RY O B L I G AT I O N S TO
P R OT E C T DATA
If a database possessor owes fiduciary obligations to
a data subject, it is reasonable to argue that regardless of
whether general tort principles would impose a duty, the
fiduciary is obliged to protect computerized information
relating to the data subject from unauthorized access
by third parties. For example, the relationship between
an attorney and client is fiduciary as a matter of law.
Accordingly, lawyers have a special obligation to protect
confidential client information, aside from any demands
imposed by ordinary tort principles. A lawyer’s broad
fiduciary obligation of confidentiality extends to all forms
of information about the client, including computerized
data,32 for the existence of the duty turns on the content,
not the form, of the information. In light of the fiduciaryduty rules on confidentiality (and the related obligations
requiring safekeeping of client property), a lawyer or law
firm could not plausibly argue that there is no duty to
safeguard computerized client data from intruders. Indeed,
the duty of safekeeping may even impose an obligation to
encrypt sensitive information.33
The same analysis should apply to all fiduciary
relationships.34 However, ordinary business relationships
are not fiduciary. In business, parties normally deal with
one another at arm’s length. The “mere acceptance of
confidential information” does not create a fiduciary
relationship,35 nor does the fact that one party “trusts
another and relies on a promise to carry out a contract.”36
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Consequently, while fiduciary-duty law may play an
important role in determining whether professionals, such
as lawyers, physicians, or trustees, have a duty to protect
the information of clients, patients, and beneficiaries from
intruders, it will not set the standard of care in most commercial settings.
S TAT U TO RY D U T I E S TO R E V E A L
S E C U R I T Y B R E AC H E S
There are at least four ways of imposing on potential
defendants a duty to reveal a compromise in database
security. First, a statute may impose a duty, either as a
result of the statute’s express terms or as a result of judicial
reliance on the statute as the proper expression of the
standard of care. Second, a duty may arise from common
law principles governing negligence liability generally.
Third, there may be a duty under the law of misrepresentation, which imposes a general duty to update previously
accurate statements (e.g., statements relating to data security) that are the basis for pending or continuing reliance
by the recipient of the statements. Finally, failure-to-act
rules may require the exercise of reasonable care to avoid
or minimize damages if a database possessor’s conduct
created a continuing risk of physical harm.
Many state security breach information acts require
certain types of database possessors (typically businesses,
but sometimes governmental agencies or other persons or
entities, such as non-profit organizations) to notify data
subjects of violations (or possible violations) of their
information’s security. Several of the states that impose
notification obligations expressly authorize a civil action
for damages.37 In addition, Illinois allows a deceptive
trade practices action,38 which permits a “person who suffers actual damage . . . [to recover] actual economic damages or any other relief which the court deems proper,”39
including “reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”40 In
other states, a variety of means are used to enforce the
notification obligation, such as administrative or civil
fines or an action by the attorney general to recover
“direct economic damages” or to remedy deceptive trade
practices.
Some state notification statutes not expressly providing for civil liability, such as the Maine Notice of Risk to
Personal Data Act,41 leave room for courts to entertain
negligence per se actions by ruling out arguments that
legislatures intended the statutorily created penalties to
be the sole measure of a database possessor’s obligations.
The Maine law states that “rights and remedies available
under [the statute] are cumulative and do not affect or
prevent rights and remedies available under federal or
state law.”42
25
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C O M M O N L AW D U T I E S TO R E V E A L
S E C U R I T Y B R E AC H E S
A key question in determining whether common law
principles should require notification is whether disclosure
of the breach would be useful or futile. If a data subject
could not do anything to protect his or her own interests
following an intrusion into data security, there would be
little reason to require notification. However, individuals
can act to protect themselves from financial and physical harm that persons with unauthorized access to their
data may cause. The federal Fair and Accurate Credit
Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA)43 allows consumers
to place a “fraud alert” in their files with credit reporting agencies. Certain state laws also enable consumers to
place a “security freeze” on their credit report, which “prohibits the consumer reporting agency from releasing the
consumer’s credit report or any information from it without the express authorization of the consumer.”44 Some
state laws permit victims of information security breaches
to obtain a court order declaring the individual a victim of
identity theft.45 That declaration can aid the data subject
in dealing with law enforcement authorities or with businesses. Consumers can also monitor their credit card and
bank accounts more closely for evidence of unauthorized
transactions or pay monthly service fees to a company that
tracks three national credit reporting companies on a daily
basis and advises subscribers of key changes to their data
(such as new applications for credit by someone using the
subscriber’s name and identity).
In many circumstances, US tort law has imposed
liability for failure to warn. Indeed, courts have sometimes
held that there is a duty to warn even when there is no
duty to do anything else. Consequently, it might reasonably follow that, even if a state holds that there is no duty
to protect databases from intrusion, there should at least
be a duty to provide notice of a security breach of the
database.
There is a duty to update previous statements that
were intended to induce reliance and that, though true
when made, have become false or misleading as a result
of subsequent developments.46 The duty extends until
recipients of the information are no longer able to protect
their own interests by foregoing reliance on the nowerroneous representation of the fact. Thus, if businesses
tell their customers, through advertisements, Web sites,
or published privacy policies, that their personal data is
secure, but then learn information to the contrary, the
businesses may have a duty to disclose those developments
to their customers. The customers have a choice whether
to continue their relationships with the businesses in
question. There has been no irrevocable reliance by a
26
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customer, even though a business-customer relationship
is already in progress. The customers may act to protect
their interests by terminating the relationship and doing
business elsewhere.
It is also well established that when a person’s prior
conduct creates a continuing risk of physical harm there is
a duty to render assistance to keep the harm from occurring or mitigate adverse consequences.47 This duty exists
even if the prior conduct was not tortious. Thus, a driver
who is involved in an auto accident must stop to render
aid, regardless of whether he was at fault for the collision.48
The harm caused by intrusions into computerized personal
data is typically more economic than physical in nature.
Yet, misuse of improperly accessed personal data can result
in a physical attack on a data subject or physical harm to
property. Hacking of a newspaper’s records, for example,
may reveal when a customer’s paper will be on vacation
hold and thereby lead to a burglary while the customer
is away on vacation. Thus, on appropriate facts, this rule
may impose a duty to disclose information about a data
security breach.
Finally, a fiduciary relationship imposes a duty of
candor. The fiduciary must exercise reasonable care to
reveal all material information to the person to whom
the fiduciary owes a duty. Indeed, when the interests of
the fiduciary and the beneficiary are adversely aligned,
fiduciary principles may require something more than
reasonable care, perhaps a degree of forthcomingness that
approximates “absolute and perfect candor.”49 If a database possessor owes fiduciary obligations to a data subject
(as in the case of an attorney and client), the possessor
must disclose information relating to a breach of database
security. The interests of the fiduciary and the data subject
are in potential conflict because there are important questions as to whether the possessor may be held responsible
for the loss of the data. The law requires the fiduciary to
subordinate personal interests to the interests of the data
subject. Non-disclosure would ordinarily be inconsistent
with those heavy obligations.
THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
The economic-loss rule is an obscure, but important,
legal doctrine, which holds that a plaintiff may not recover
economic losses resulting from the defendant’s negligence
without corresponding physical damage to the plaintiff’s
person or property. Obviously, if the economic-loss rule
applies to cybersecurity cases, it has the potential to greatly limit the scope of recoverable damages. Consequently,
it is important to understand the policies underlying the
rule and the nature of its restrictions. Viewed from the
standpoint of public policy, the economic-loss rule serves
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three different functions: avoidance of too broad a scope
of liability; insistence that damages be proved with certainty; and definition of the doctrinal boundary between
contract law and torts.
First, somewhat crudely, the economic-loss rule protects potential defendants from the risk of a disproportionately wide range of liability.50 This is an important
function, for acts of negligence often have broad adverse
economic consequences. Without this protection, there
would be no sensible stopping point to tort liability.
For example, a referee who negligently made a bad call
that eliminated a team from the playoffs could be liable
for the lost profits of merchants who sell team-related
items, or a person who caused an auto accident could be
responsible for the economic losses that resulted from the
delays of persons tied up in traffic. Not surprisingly, the
Restatement provides, as a general rule, that there is no
liability for negligent interference with contracts or economically promising relations.51
Second, lost economic opportunities are often not
readily susceptible to precise calculation.52 Yet, the law
insists that damages must be proved with reasonable
certainty. By ruling out litigation in a huge range of cases
(suits involving no personal injury or property damage),
the economic-loss rule helps to ensure (again somewhat
crudely) that compensation is not awarded for amounts
that are speculative. In the process, the economic-loss
rule promotes judicious use of limited judicial resources,
ensuring that those scarce assets are not squandered on
the burdensome, and perhaps dubious, task of trying to
quantify endless economic losses that may, in truth, not
be provable with reasonable precision.
Third and most importantly, the economic-loss rule
marks the boundary between contract law and tort law.
Delineating these two bodies of law is vital, for otherwise
there is a risk that “contract law would drown in a sea of
tort.”53 The law of contracts has meaning only because
entering into an agreement has legal consequences. One
of those consequences is that, if a person makes a bad
deal, he usually must suffer the result. This reality creates
an incentive for contracting parties to exercise diligence
to protect their own interests. It would render superfluous
a great part of contract law if parties who strike disadvantageous bargains could successfully complain that they
should recover damages because the other side failed to
exercise reasonable care to protect their interests.
With these three policy considerations in mind—
scope of liability, certainty of damages, and delineation
of the boundary between contract law and torts—the
questions are whether the economic-loss rule should apply
to cybersecurity cases, and if so, what claims for damages
the rule might bar. Answering those questions involves
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consideration of the types of economic losses that may
arise in these cases, as well as the efficacy of contract
law and the insurance market in addressing such losses.
Unauthorized use of personal information can result in
many types of harm. In cybersecurity cases where breaches
of security result in identity theft, the losses include, but
are not limited to: (1) out-of-pocket expenses incurred to
restore a good credit rating; (2) personal time spent on
that task; and (3) lost opportunities resulting from bad
credit.
Focusing first on out-of-pocket losses, there is little
policy justification for denying recovery. Various estimates
currently peg out-of-pocket costs in a typical case between
$800 and $1,400. Although the amount of out-of-pocket
damages may vary, this element of damages is susceptible
to proof with a high degree of certainty. The plaintiff can
gather receipts, make a list, and total the sum. There is
no reason to deny compensation for amounts actually and
reasonably spent on restoring a good credit rating on the
ground that out-of-pocket damages are speculative.
Nor does recovery of out-of-pocket costs present a
case that requires a tightly circumscribed circle of liability
to prevent an over extension of legal responsibility. In
many cases, there will be a business relationship between
the database possessor and the damaged data subject, and
in other cases the relationship (presumably) is sufficiently
close enough that the defendant had some legitimate
reason to maintain a database containing personal information about the plaintiff. These are not situations where
some stranger in the community (e.g., the vendor of the
losing team’s products or the person tied up in traffic) is
seeking to recover damages. If a database possessor wishes
to constrict the scope of potential liability, it can always
do so by removing the personal information of data subjects from its database. But if it fails to do so, courts should
be reluctant to deny recovery of out-of-pocket losses to
data subjects. The database possessor chose to maintain
personal information in a form where one of the risks was
unauthorized access.
If the scope of liability and uncertainty of damages
are not significant considerations, the only question is
whether the boundary between contracts and torts is a
good reason for a court to say that this type of loss should
be compensated only if a contractual obligation exists.
The answer to that question is no.
An emerging consensus, reflected in the recently
passed state security breach notification statutes, suggests
that rights relating to protection of personal data and
notification of security breaches are not proper subjects for
bargaining between the parties. Many state laws, such as
the Rhode Island Identity Theft Protection Act of 2005,54
provide that a waiver of a data subject’s rights is against
27
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public policy and therefore void and unenforceable. If that
is true, it makes little sense that consumers should bargain
and pay for the level of cybersecurity protection—and
the right to sue for out-of-pocket damages—that they
desire. Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to expect bargaining to occur between individual consumers and the
large corporations that play a pervasive role in modern
life. Individuals often lack both the commercial leverage
and the information necessary to assess the risks that they
face. In light of the ubiquity of computerized databases,
ordinary persons would have to devote a huge amount of
energy to negotiating the parameters of data protection
with every potential defendant if contract law were the
only solution to these types of problems.
As an alternative to this sort of David-versus-an-armyof-Goliaths contractual model, a better paradigm would
routinely permit recovery of foreseeable and necessary outof-pocket losses from the tortfeasor. Compensation of outof-pocket losses should not depend on whether the data
subject read the fine print in the defendant’s privacy policy
or bargained for a specific level of protection. Instead,
compensation should depend on the reasonableness of the
amount spent to restore a good credit rating. Tort law can
perform this function better than contract law.
A different analysis is required with respect to requests
for recovery of compensation for time spent restoring one’s
good credit or for opportunities lost as a result of a bad
credit rating. Victims of identity theft spend 600 hours
on average to restore their credit. The harm suffered by
these victims is tremendous, but valuing these lost hours
would be difficult. If damages amounted to compensation
for the plaintiffs’ time measured at their usual hourly rates
of earnings, the awards to professionals, minimum wage
workers, and unemployed homemakers would vary widely.
Similarly, if every victim received the same amount for the
value of lost time, how would that amount be set? Ensuring
uniformity in valuing damages for lost time is a task better
committed to legislatures than to the multitude of factfinders who will preside over numerous tort claims.
The problems of compensating for the value of lost
opportunities, such as the lost chance to buy a house,
obtain a car loan, or open a cell phone account, are also
obvious. How does one prove precisely which opportunities the plaintiff lost and what those opportunities meant
in economic terms to the plaintiff? In addition, there is a
clear risk of imposing an excessively wide range of liability.
Negligence requires only a momentary misstep. To say
that a negligent database possessor should be liable to a
broad class of persons for all of their lost opportunities, as
well as out-of-pocket and perhaps other damages, would
quickly pose a serious risk of liability disproportionate to
fault. These issues suggest that courts have a greater reason
28
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to apply the economic-loss rule to bar claims for lost time
and lost opportunities than to hold that a plaintiff cannot
recover out-of-pocket losses.55
The economic-loss rule, as defined in most states, has
important limits. First, it bars only claims for economic
harm caused by negligence.56 A plaintiff may thus be able
to avoid the rule by proving more culpable conduct, such
as recklessness or intentional wrong-doing. Second, the
economic-loss rule is a common law doctrine that does
not preempt legislative provisions to the contrary. Liability
for negligently caused economic harm may be actionable
pursuant to statute. At least one state, Illinois, expressly
allows for recovery of economic losses in cybersecurity
cases.57 Third, many types of harm caused by intrusion
are not purely economic. Thus, the rule does not bar
recovery of damages for personal injury, property damage,
and, perhaps, emotional distress. Fourth, some states show
little enthusiasm for the economic-loss rule58 and may
determine that it does not apply to cybersecurity cases.
Finally, virtually all states that embrace the economic-loss
rule recognize exceptions. For example, economic damages
are routinely recoverable in negligent misrepresentation
actions.59 Many states also allow persons whose legacies are
lost due to negligent preparation of a will to sue to recover
those economic damages.60 A court might determine that
the relationship between a database possessor and data
subject is sufficiently special to warrant recovery of out-ofpocket losses resulting from identity theft, notwithstanding
the economic-loss rule.
E M OT I O N A L - D I S T R E S S DA M AG E S
States differ tremendously over whether negligently
caused emotional-distress claims are actionable. Some
jurisdictions hold that emotional-distress damages are
almost never recoverable,61 but others seem quite willing to entertain claims for psychic suffering caused by a
tortfeasor’s failure to exercise due care.
One arena in which a consensus of sorts has emerged
is the fear-of-disease cases. In these suits, the plaintiff
alleges that the defendant’s tortious conduct subjected the
plaintiff to emotional distress based on fear of contracting
a contagious disease. Many of these cases have involved
HIV or AIDS, but the precedent extends somewhat further to fear of cancer and other diseases. In addressing
these claims, courts generally hold that a plaintiff may
recover emotional-distress damages only if the plaintiff
was actually exposed to the disease.62 Courts deem fear of
disease in the absence of exposure to be unreasonable and
therefore not compensable.
The precedent that has emerged in these cases provides a logical starting point for determining whether a
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data subject should be able to recover for emotional-distress losses resulting from unauthorized database intrusion
and fear of identity theft or other harm. If there is no
evidence that an intruder actually accessed the plaintiff’s
data, and the evidence proves only a risk of unauthorized access, courts ordinarily should deny emotional-distress damages, which are inherently difficult to quantify.
However, some cases will warrant a presumption of unauthorized access. If the defendant has allowed or caused the
best evidence of exposure to be lost or destroyed, courts
reasonably may assume that exposure occurred absent
proof to the contrary. Some fear-of-disease cases take this
approach.63
In cases involving intentional infliction of emotional
distress, courts have assiduously required that the distress
be severe before it is compensable.64 This severity requirement is all the more applicable when the distress results
from mere alleged negligence. Presumably, in only rare
cases will it be possible for a data subject who does not
suffer physical harm to recover emotional-distress damages
relating to data intrusion.65
C R E D I T- M O N I TO R I N G DA M AG E S
Database possessors who suffer a security breach are
often reluctant to discover and report those developments
for fear of triggering adverse publicity, legal liability, or
increased attacks by hackers. As a result, there can be an
undesirable lag between the occurrence of an intrusion,
discovery of that breach, and revelation of the events
to data subjects. Yet, prompt revelation of a breach is
important because it enables data subjects to protect their
interests through increased vigilance against identity theft
and other types of harm.
State security breach notification laws currently
provide only a limited incentive for database possessors
to discover intrusion because legislatures ordinarily base
notification obligations on actual discovery or notification
of the intrusion rather than when the database possessor
should have discovered the breach. In addition, legislatures typically impose a low cap on the civil fines that
apply to a breach of a general statutory duty to protect
customer information, which may provide insufficient
inducement for best practices.66
Legislatures should give database possessors a legal
incentive to discover and report unauthorized database
intrusions. That incentive could take the form of a limitation on liability. One reasonable option would be to cap
the database possessor’s exposure to liability at the moment
that the database possessor reveals the breach to the data
subject. Notification could serve as the pivotal factor in
shifting further responsibility (beyond the damages cap)
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from the database possessor to the data subject. Once the
database possessor provides notice of the security breach,
the data subject is in a better position than the database
possessor to monitor the risk of harm and to take action
against threats to the data subject’s credit and personal
security.
The cap on damages could take the form of limiting
liability to an amount equivalent to the out-of-pocket
costs of monitoring credit ratings and taking other reasonably necessary steps to prevent identity theft and related
losses. “Credit-monitoring damages” would be similar in
concept to the medical monitoring damages that some
state67 and federal68 courts allow victims of toxic exposure
to recover. The analogy is apt. A data subject who loses
personal data due to a security breach, like a person who
suffers exposure to a toxic substance, is at risk of further
harm. The harm (e.g., identity theft in the case of the
data subject or cancer in the case of the toxic-exposure
victim) may or may not later occur. However, the reasonable and prudent course is to incur the expenses necessary
to monitor the risk that harm may develop. The victim of
the exposure is thereby in a better position to take prompt
action; in one case, to combat the risk of financial harm
from data misuse, and in the other to secure medical care
to address the risk of developing an illness.
The bargain of capping a cybersecurity plaintiff’s
damages at the cost of monitoring credit if the database
possessor provides notification of a security breach is not
a bad one. From the standpoint of the data subject, the
plaintiff may be better off with a warning and reimbursement for the out-of-pocket costs of vigilance than gambling on a tort action against the database possessor. A
tort suit would be fraught with many obstacles: a possibly
short statute of limitations; a risk that the court will not
find the database possessor’s negligence to be a proximate
cause of resulting criminal conduct; a likelihood that the
economic-loss or exposure rules may bar key portions of
the damages; and a possibility that the court might find
that the database possessor had no duty at all.
Nor is the bargain bad for database possessors.
Capping damages at the cost of credit monitoring would
avoid the risk of catastrophic liability for personal injuries
that sometimes occur, the possibility of exposure to property-damage claims, and the chance that a court might
narrowly construe the applicability of the economic-loss
rule. Some companies faced with the risk of liability from
loss of personal data have voluntarily provided affected
persons with credit-monitoring protection.69 However,
courts have been reluctant to award credit monitoring
damages.70
Moreover, society would be better off if the law
capped damages at the cost of credit monitoring in
29
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exchange for victim notification whenever there is a
security breach. The only ways to minimize the losses
stemming from database intrusions (aside from criminal
penalties, which seem ineffective) are to spur investment
in data security, to discover when intrusions occur, and
to warn persons whose interests are at risk. A cap on
damages in exchange for notification of security breaches
would not undercut the database possessors’ incentives
to invest in data security. Database possessors would still
be subject to state and federal laws that impose various
sanctions relating to cybersecurity; they would still face
the threats of bad publicity and consumer disaffection
resulting from disclosure of security breaches; and at
least some possessors (e.g., credit card companies) would
still stand to lose millions of dollars as a result of unauthorized use of personal information. However, capping
damages at credit-monitoring costs would help to ensure
that database possessors are not subject to ruinous tort
judgments. The cap would create incentives to discover
security breaches and to internalize the resulting creditmonitoring costs that those intrusions entail. In addition, the cap on damages might also reduce the threat
of overburdening already overworked federal and state
courts. The cap would greatly simplify damages issues in
cybersecurity cases and guidance from the courts would
quickly define the average costs of security monitoring,
thereby promoting the settlement of cases. Indeed, limiting liability to security-monitoring damages is also likely
to promote insurance coverage of intruder-related losses
by making the extent of liability more certain, thereby
facilitating the pricing of insurance coverage.
A damages cap should not apply to cases involving egregious conduct. A plaintiff who can establish
that the defendant acted with reckless indifference or
intentional disregard in failing to protect data should be
able to avoid the limitation on liability. Similarly, if the
defendant did not disclose a security breach, liability for
a breach of the notification duty or of the duty to protect
data should extend as far as the usual rules of tort law
allow.
A cap on database possessor liability at the costs of
credit-monitoring damages can be legislatively enacted.
However, in the absence of legislation to the contrary,
questions relating to duty, proximate causation (including shifting responsibility), and damages have traditionally been within the province of the courts. State law
may permit courts to determine that, if a database possessor negligently fails to protect computerized personal
information, the database possessor has no legal obligation other than to pay for credit-monitoring damages if
the database possessor revealed the breach to the data
subject.
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SECURITY IN INSECURE TIMES
Modern society is built on fragile foundations of
computerized personal data. If this society is to endure
and prosper, then it must vigilantly safeguard those foundations. Tort law offers an appropriate legal regime for
allocating the risks and spreading the costs of database
intrusion-related losses. Tort law can also create incentives, on the part of both database possessors and data
subjects, to minimize the harm associated with breaches
of database security. Courts and legislatures must consider
carefully the role of tort liability in protecting computerized data. If those who make and interpret the laws too
hastily conclude that database possessors are not liable for
losses occasioned by unauthorized data access, whether
because there is no duty, no proximate causation, or no
recoverable damages, important opportunities to reduce
and distribute the costs of computerized technology will
be lost. If liability is too readily assessed, important institutions will be adversely affected and with them the prosperity of modern society. Security in insecure times requires a
sensitive balancing of competing interests. Established tort
principles carefully applied to the contemporary problems
of cybersecurity and identity theft can perform a key role
in protecting the economic foundations of modern life.
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